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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: HYPOCRITICAL
EUPHEMISM OR NOBLE MANDATE?*
Theodore J. St. Antoinet

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 was adopted in an
atmosphere of monumental naivete. Congress apparently believed
that equal employment opportunity could be achieved simply by

forbidding employers or unions to "discriminate" on the basis of
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, '

2

and expressly

disavowed any intention to require "preferential treatment."

3

Perhaps animated by the Supreme Court's stirring desegregation
decisions of the 1950's, 4 the proponents of civil rights legislation
5
made "color-blindness" the rallying cry of the hour.
Today we know better. The dreary statistics, so familiar to
anyone who works in this field, tell the story. Others have provided
exhaustive surveys of the figures, 6 and I shall not review them at
any length. It is enough to observe that after a decade of federally

enforced nondiscrimination in employment, minorities are still
twice as likely as whites not to have jobs. 7 The median family

income of blacks as compared with that of whites has improved

8
negligibly, from 54 percent in 1964 to 58 percent in the mid-70's.
Minorities continue to occupy a disproportionately low percentage

*The text is a revision of a paper delivered on November 28, 1975, in Newark, New
Jersey, at the Rutgers University Symposium in observance of the tenth anniversary of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Published by the permission of Rutgers
University and EEOC. EEOC reserves the right to authorize further publication.
tDean and Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. A.B., 1951, Fordham
College; J.D., 1954, University of Michigan.
142 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000h-6 (1970), as amended (Supp. III 1973) [hereinafter cited as
CRA].
2
CRA, supra note 1, at §§ 703(a)-703(d).
3
CRA, supra note 1, at § 7030).
4
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (public schools); Muir v. Louisville
Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954) (pfblic amphitheater); Mayor of Baltimore v.
Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (public beaches); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955)
(public parks). See also Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political
Responsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 679 (1975).
5
See text accompanying notes 54-56 infra.
'See, e.g., L. THUROW, POVERTY AND DISCRIMINATION (1969), and authorities cited in
notes 7-10 infra.
'U.S.

COMMISSION ON CIVIL

RIGHTS,

THE FEDERAL

CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT

EFFORT - 1974, VOL. V, To ELIMINATE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 407 n.1459 (1975)

[hereinafter cited CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT]; U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPT. OF
COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SPECIAL STUDIES, SERIES P-23, No. 54, THE
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE BLACK POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1974,
at 1, 64 (1975) [hereinafter cited BLACK POPULATION STATUS].
'BLACK POPULATION STATUS, supra note 7, at 2, 25.
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of the more attractive positions. 9 The employment situation of
women in relation to white males is similarly bleak. 10
If we are to secure genuine equality of opportunity for the races
and the sexes in the job market within the foreseeable future,
something more is plainly needed than the mere prohibition of
positive acts of discrimination and the substitution of a policy of
passive neutrality. "Affirmative action" of the sort that has been
ordered by the federal courts and federal agencies has held out the
greatest promise of success and, at the same time, has aroused the
fiercest opposition. This article will focus upon the nature and the
legality of this potent but controversial weapon against discrimination.

I.

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AS A
REMEDY FOR DISCRIMINATORY CONDUCT

Affirmative action takes several forms. An employer may merely
attempt, through advertising and word-of-mouth publicity, to enlarge the number of minorities and women in the pool of applicants
without according them any preferential treatment in the hiring
decision itself. Or a union and an employer may agree to increase
the percentage of minorities or women in the union's and
employer's joint job-training program. Or, finally, the employer
may give preferential treatment to minorities or women in the
actual employment process-in hiring, promoting, or laying off. In
these various instances, the affirmative action may involve setting
numerical or percentage "goals" or "targets," which the employer
or union will make a "good faith" effort to reach, or it may even
involve fixing an absolute "quota" that must be met. Another
important distinction can be drawn between (1) affirmative action
required by a court as part of a remedy for proven past discrimination in violation of Title VII or of the Civil Rights Acts of 186611 or
1871,12 and (2) affirmative action required under Executive Order
11246 13 as a condition of securing and retaining a contract from the
federal government, even though the contracting party has not
been shown to have violated any statutory prohibition against
discrimination.
9
CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT, supra note 7, at 470-72; BLACK POPULATION STATUS,
supra note 7, at 2, 73. Yet there has been a modest betterment of minority job status, as any
veteran airline traveler can attest after scanning a group of fellow passengers. From 1964 to
1974, the percentage of minorities in white collar occupations increased from 16 to 24 (the
comparable percentages for whites were 41 and 42). Id.
'°CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT, supra note 7, at 470-72. The median income of full-time
female workers in the early 1970's was only 60 percent that of males.
1142 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
1242 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
133 C.F.R. 169 (1974), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app., at 281 (1970).
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The first of these last two types of affirmative action obligations
for employers or unions may entail hiring or accepting into membership a specific number of minority persons, or hiring or accepting blacks and whites on a fixed ratio until a certain percentage of
blacks are employed or admitted to membership. Such court orders
against both unions and public and private employers have been
Civil Rights Acts,' 1 4 as well as
sustained under the 1866 and 1871
15
under Title VII of the 1964 Act.
Once a particular discriminatory violation has been found, the
courts have not been much troubled about using a racial preference
or a fixed formula in fashioning relief. Often cited in support of this
approach is the Supreme Court's school desegregation decision in
Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of Education,16 where it
was suggested that "mathematical ratios" may serve "as a useful
starting point in shaping a remedy."' 1 7 There also seems to have
been quiet acceptance of the notion that the established past discrimination justifies a quota form of relief, despite the fact that the
remedy will aid a victimized group rather than any identifiable
individual discriminatees.
Another potential hurdle in Title VII cases which has been
cleared is section 703(j) of the CRA. 18 This provision precludes an
interpretation of Title VII that would require "preferential treat14

NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974); Erie Human Relations Comm'n v. Tullio,
493 F.2d 731 (3d Cir. 1974); Vulcan Soc'y v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir.
1973); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir.
1973); Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973) (en banc); Carter v. Gallaher,
452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972). The 1866 Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), has recently been interpreted to prohibit private acts of employment
discrimination, but it is limited to racial cases. Caldwell v. Nat'l Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044
(5th Cir. 1971); Young v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971). The 1871 Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), requires the presence of state action, but applies broadly to any
deprivation of constitutional rights, including discrimination based on race, sex, or national
origin. See, e.g., the O'Neill, Bridgeport, Vulcan Society, and Tullio cases, supra.
15EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975); Rios v. Steamfitters Local
638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Masonry Contractors Ass'n, 497 F.2d 871
(6th Cir. 1974); United States v. N. L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Ironworkers Local
86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); United States v. IBEW
Local 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970); Heat and Frost
Insulators Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
16402 U.S. 1 (1971).
1
1d. at 25.
"Section 7030), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(j) (1970), reads in its entirety as follows:
Noting contained in this article shall be interpreted to require any employer,
employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee
subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any
group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual
or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total
number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex or national origin
employed by any employer, referred or classified for employment by any employment agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or classified by any
labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other
training program, in comparison with the total number of percentage of persons of
such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State, section,
or other area, or in the available work force in any community, State, section, or
HeinOnline -- 10 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 30 1976-1977
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ment" to eliminate any "imbalance" of race or sex. The courts
have concluded, however, that section 703(j) was only intended to
negate any obligation to engage in "preferential quota hiring as a
means of chafiging a racial imbalance attributable to causes other
than unlawful discriminatory conduct."' 9 In cases of proven discrimation, section 706(g)'s 20 authorization of "affirmative action" to remedy unfair employment practices is controlling, and
comprehends the power to order preferential treatment, often the
most effective means of eliminating the consequences of discrimination.
Even so, Professors Harry Edwards and Barry Zaretsky, in a
comprehensive study, of preferential relief, have emphasized that
the courts have tended to circumscribe quota orders carefully, in
order to minimize the problems of "reverse discrimination"
against white males. 21 Thus, for example, the order is almost
always limited in duration, and set to expire at the end of a given
period of time or upon the meeting of a specified goal. 22 Furthermore, preferential remedies are usually employed only when no
feasible alternative means exist for offsetting the effects of the

discrimination .23
An especially knotty remedial problem is the granting of retroactive seniority to discriminatees when this will adversely affect the
promotional or layoff rights of innocent incumbent employees. The
Supreme Court has upheld such retroactive relief in favor of identifiable job applicants who have been the victims of discrimination. 24
On the other hand, several federal courts of appeals have indicated
that retroactive seniority inimical to incumbents should not be
awarded to minorities or women who cannot establish that they
themselves have been subjected to discrimination. 25 The Second
Circuit has recently sought to enunciate some general guidelines
for these cases, declaring that quota relief is proper only when
there is a pattern of long-continued and egregious discrimination,
1'Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 662, 630 (2d Cir. 1974). See also the Vogler,
IBEW, Ironworkers, and Lathers cases, supra note 15. See generally Oburn v. Sharp 521
F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1975).
2042 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g) (1970).
2' Edwards & Zaretsky, Preferential Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 74 MICH.
L. 2REV. 1, 32 (1975).
1 1d. at 9, 32.
'lid.
at 10, 35.
24
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). Accord, Acha v. Beame. 531
F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1976); Chance v. Board of Examiners, II Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1450 (2d Cir. 1976); Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975).
25
Kirkland v. Dep't of Correctional Services. 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975); Watkins v.
Steelworkers Local 2369, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 11
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1450 (2d Cir. 1976). See also Jersey Central Power & Light Co.
v. IBEW Local 327, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded sub nora. EEOC v.
Jersey Central Power & Light Co.. 425 U.S. 987 (1976), cert. denied. 425 U.S. 998 (1976) and
Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 314 (4th Cir. 1976).
But see United States v. Navajo Freight Lines. Inc.. 525 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1975): United
States v. Time-DC, Inc., 517 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1975).
HeinOnline -- 10 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 31 1976-1977
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and when the impact of the quota will not be concentrated on a
small, ascertainable group of nonminority persons.2 6 None of this
developing body of law is directly applicable, however, until a
discriminatory violation has been found, and a court is attempting
to fashion an appropriate remedy.
II. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AS A CONDITION
OF FEDERAL CONTRACTS

The harder case involves the imposition of affirmative action
hiring "goals" or "quotas" on a government contractor under
Executive Order 11246, despite the absence of any demonstrated
past discrimination by the employer or by any union representing
the employer's employees. I shall argue (1) that the Executive
Order's affirmative action in effect calls for race and sex preferences in recruitment and hiring, and that the government's occasional disclaimers or denunciations of "reverse discrimination"
are disingenuous; (2) that, at least in the present stage of our long,
frustrating struggle to eradicate all vestiges of discrimination, conditioning government contracts on such preferences is constitutionally permissible; and (3) that such preferences should not be
held violative of Title VII, although there is obviously more doubt
on this last point.
A.

Preferential Treatment

Revised Order 4, issued by the Department of Labor's Office of
Federal Contract Compliance in 1972, implements Executive
Order 11246 by setting forth "Affirmative Action Guidelines" to
cover federal contractors and subcontractors in industries other
than construction. 27 Its essence is conveyed by section 60-2.10:
An affirmative action program is a set of specific and
result-orientedprocedures to which a contractor commits himself to apply every good faith effort.... An acceptable affirmative program must include an analysis of areas within which
the contractor is deficient in the utilization of minority groups
and women, and further, goals and timetables to which the
contractor's good faith efforts must be directed to correct the
28
deficiencies.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission indicates that
'6 EEOC v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 638, 12 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 755 (2d Cir.
1976); Kirkland v. Dep't of Correctional Services, 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975).
2741 C.F.R. §§ 60-2.1 to 60-2.32 (1976). The construction industry is covered by 41 C.F.R.
§§ 60-1.1 to 60-1.47 (1976).
28
Id. § 60-2.10 (emphasis supplied).
HeinOnline -- 10 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 32 1976-1977
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the success of an affirmative action program will be determined in
large part by its results. Employers are told there must be a
"measurable, yearly improvement in hiring, training and promotion of minorities and females in all parts of your organization. ' 2 9
Revised Order 4 counsels employers to have recruiting sources
"actively recruit and refer minorities and women for all positions
listed," and to notify "minority and women's organizations" of the
company's affirmative action policy. 30 The Office for Civil Rights
in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, which is
responsible for the enforcement of Executive Order 11246 in institutions of higher education, urges universities to seek academic
personnel by using as recruitment channels women and minorities
who are already in academic or professional positions. 3 1
At the same time, however, Revised Order 4 warns employers:
"Goals may not be rigid and inflexible quotas which must be
met. ' ' 32 Even more specifically, OFCC declares: "The purpose of
a contractor's establishment and use of goals is to insure that he
meet his affirmative action obligation. It is not intended and should
not be used to discriminate against any applicant or employee
because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. ' ' 33 According to HEW, a university is still entitled to select the "most
qualified" candidate, without regard to race or sex. 34 Moreover, it
would be a violation of the Executive Order for an academic
department to prefer a woman for a post in order to meet an
affirmative action goal, or to consider only blacks for an opening in
a black studies program. 3 5 While all employment advertising must
state that a contracting institution is an "equal opportunity
employer," it would be "unacceptable" to say that "this is an
36
affirmative action position."
In a celebrated article supporting the Supreme Court's conclusions in the early school desegregation cases, 3 7 Professor Charles
Black resorted to the philosopher's "sovereign prerogative of
laughter" to dispose of the claims that the "separate but equal"
doctrine had any meaning in the context of the actual conditions
then prevailing in the South. 3 8 With all due respect for those who
29

EQUAL

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

EMPLOYMENT:

A

GUIDEBOOK

COMM'N, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
FOR EMPLOYERS (January, 1975), quoted in

AND EQUAL

Fair Employ-

ment Practice Manual (BNA) 421:205.
3041 C.F.R. § 60.2.21(b) (1) and (3) (1976).
"'Fair Employment Practice Manual (BNA) 490:60c.
3241 C.F.R. § 60-2.12(e) (1975).
33
ld. § 60-2.30.
34
Memorandum to College and University Presidents, Dec. 1974, 40 Fed. Reg. 2459, 2460
(1975).
35

36 d.

d.

37

See note 4 supra.

3

1Black, The Laiwfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L. J. 421, 424 (1960).
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may believe otherwise, 3 9 I think that laughter is also the most apt
response to anyone who would deny that the inevitable thrust of
affirmative action programs is to impel employers to prefer
minorities and women in recruitment and hiring. Lip service is paid
to the concept of nondiscrimination to the point where the conscientious employer or union must begin to feel schizophrenic, but
in the end it is the "results" that count.
In my view, the compulsion of disparate treatment is epitomized
by the official recommendations for soliciting applications from
minority and women leaders and organizations. We would not
countenance parallel inquiries addressed to white males concerning "the best qualified white males you know." I trust that almost
no one would maintain that minorities and women are to be contacted in order to secure color-blind and sex-neutral recommendations of candidates.
Many persons draw a sharp distinction between color-conscious
and sex-conscious recruitment, that is, enlarging the pool of job
applicants through advertising and soliciting on the one hand, and
color-conscious and sex-conscious employment decisions on the
other. Surely there is an important practical difference here, and as
a matter of public policy we might well decide to require or permit
the one and not the other. But if there is an absolute constitutional
or statutory ban on employment preferences based on race or sex,
it must reach the first, often critical, stage of recruiting, as well as
the later stages of hiring, promoting, and so on. In any event, there
seems to be ample evidence that the government's affirmative
action programs have led to race-based and sex-based hiring in
40
industry and education.
The question, then, is not whether affirmative action involves
preferential treatment, but whether such preferential treatment is
defensible as a matter of constitutional and statutory law and as a
matter of sound social policy.
B.

The Constitution

The Constitution has been said to be "color-blind," ' 41 but the
Constitution itself says no such thing. It does not even preclude, in
39
For thoughtful defenses of affirmative action programs, within the more traditional
formulation that they do not in fact involve what would or might be illegal preferences based
on race or sex, see Jones, The Bugaboo of Employment Quotas, 1970 Wis. L. REV. 341,
379-82; Nash, Affirmative Action Under Executive Order 11,246, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 225, 230
See also The Quota Controversy, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 21, 1972. at 9-10.
(1971).
40

See, e.g., N. GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION 33-66 (1975); Seligman, How

"Equal Opportunity" Turned into Employment Quotas, FORTUNE, March 1973, at 160;
Affirmative Action: The Negative Side, TIME, July 15, 1974, at 86; Discrimination in Higher
Education: A Debate on Faculty Employment, C. R. DIG., Spring 1975, at 3.
4
See, e.g., Harlan, J., dissenting in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 5591(1896).
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terms, disparate treatment of the races or the sexes. All that the
fourteenth amendment guarantees is "the equal protection of the
laws."142 Fifth amendment due process incorporates similar
safeguards. 43 The mandate of equal treatment, however, presupposes equal status or circumstances. 44 Whether governmentsponsored preferences based on race or sex are constitutionally
permissible should therefore depend upon an examination of the
similarity or dissimilarity in the contemporary status and situation
of minorities and women on the one hand and of white males on the
other. True, the Supreme Court has declared that race is a "suspect" governmental classification, 45 but even racial preferences
may be justified if they serve a compelling governmental interest
and are the least drastic means of accomplishing an appropriate
end. 4 6 Indeed, where racial classification is used for "benign"
purposes, that is, to benefit rather than disadvantage a minority
group, it has been argued that the less strict "rational basis" test of
47
constitutionality should be applied.
Moving beyond these efforts to fit the problem of race-based and
sex-based preferences into the conventional framework of constitutional analysis, a major article by Professor Terrance Sandalow seems persuasive that the ultimate test of the validity of any
racial or sexual classification lies in an evaluation of its implications for the kind of society we are seeking. 48 If preferential treatment is a necessary step toward a more fully integrated work force
and toward genuine equality of employment opportunity, then no
constitutional barriers should stand in the way. Professor Sandalow recognizes that this approach imposes on the courts the
burden of making difficult value judgments, but he contends that
"value choices . . . are inescapable if the equal protection clause is
to be employed as a measure of legislative power. 49 Of course, this
places heavy stress on judicial deference to the initial legislative
42
U.S. Const. amend. XIV,
43
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
44

§ 1.

497 (1954).
This concept is more fully elaborated in Sandalow, supra note 4, at 654-63, to which I am
deeply indebted, and to which I refer anyone interested in the philosophical underpinnings
of 4the theory I have merely sketched here.
1McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
46
See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). See also
Edwards
& Zaretsky, supra note 21, at 12.
47Ely, The Constitutionalityof Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 723,
728-36 (1974); Edwards & Zaretsky, supra note 21, at 14. See also Morton v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535 (1974) (employment preferences for American Indians). Cf. Kahn v. Shevin, 416
U.S. 351 (1974) (property tax exemption for widows but not widowers). For a strong
statement that the Constitution flatly proscribes all racial classification in the distribution of
benefits and costs by government, see Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality
of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. Cr. REV. I.
4
aSandalow, supra note 4, at 653.
49
1d. at 654.
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judgment in the absence of a patent breach of established constitutional limitations, but that is wholly in keeping with our traditions
of democratic decisionmaking.
Two reservations must be noted about this latter mode of analysis. First, as Sandalow and others have observed, 50 judicial leniency in scrutinizing the preferential policies of government is most
justified in theory, and most evident in practice, when such policies
bear the stamp of explicit legislative approval. Quasiadministrative action, such as that of state universities, may be
subject to a more searching inquiry. Executive action, which
perhaps carries the implied sanction of the legislature, falls somewhere in between. This last category would seem to include the
Presidential Executive Order instituting the federal affirmative action program, and the departmental regulations implementing it.
Second, I have to concede that the Supreme Court's curious
timidity in backing away from a ruling on the preferential law
school admissions policy at issue in DeFunis v. Odegaard5 1 raises
doubts about any theory which supports racial preference. The
case was declared moot on the ground the student who had challenged the special minority admissions program was about to
graduate. But the Court knew of that likelihood at the time it
accepted the case and heard oral argument. The conclusion seems
inescapable that five Justices simply got cold feet when forced to a
choice between slowing minority progress and declaring that the
Constitution is not "color-blind" after all. Further uncertainty
about what decision might have emerged is created by Justice
Douglas' separate opinion, denouncing in absolutist terms any use
of race as a criterion for governmental determination.
A number of persons who are experienced in the civil rights field
have speculated that a majority of the Supreme Court will try to
avoid a resolution of the constitutionality of racial preferences until
the need for them is past. At that point the Court would be free to
issue a ringing (but meaningless) reaffirmation of "colorblindness." I find this thought disquieting. Although I believe that
race-based preferences can be squared with the Constitution, I
realize that they necessarily mean that certain persons will be
deprived, at least in the short run, of the very advantages the
minorities acquire. If the Constitution is indeed color-blind, the
10ld. at 693-703; Edwards & Zaretsky, supra note 21, at 15.
51416 U.S. 312 (1974) (four Justices dissenting), vacating and remanding as moot 82
Wash.2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973). See also Cramer v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 12
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1397 (E.D. Va. 1976) (invalidating preferential female hiring
for state university faculty); Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal.3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152,
132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3555 (1977) (invalidating preferential
minority admissions for state medical schools where not shown necessary for integrating
school).
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Court would thus be leaving unredressed the denial of some highly
important individual rights. I prefer to believe that in due course
the Court will come to grips with this vital issue, and will decide it
with full awareness that "equal protection" is not a mathemati-

those who
cian's construct, but a realist's injunction to treat alike
52
are, in this remarkably diverse world, truly alike.

C.

Title VII

Section 703 of the Civil, Rights Act forbids an employer or union
to "discriminate . . .because of ... race."15 3 The leading case on
the applicability of section 703 to affirmative action called for by
Executive Order 11246 is Contractors Association of Eastern
Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor.5 4 There, a challenge was
mounted to the Department of Labor's so-called "Philadelphia
Plan," under which federal contractors in the Philadelphia area
would have to make good faith efforts to meet specific percentage

"goals" for minority group employment in six construction trades.

The goals ranged from 4 percent to 9 percent for 1970 up to from 19
percent to 26 percent for 1973. They were based upon such factors

as the availability of minority group persons for employment in
each trade, and the impact of the program on the existing labor
force. The plan was upheld against constitutional attack on due
process and equal protection grounds, and was found to be neither
violative of Title VII nor inconsistent with the National Labor
Relations Act. The court viewed the program as an appropriate

requirement of "affirmative action" to remedy the lack of minority
52

The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 18
Cal.3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3555 (1977),
where the California Supreme Court invalidated preferential minority admissions for the
medical school at the University of California, Davis.
5
1CRA, supra note 1, at § 703.
54442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971). See also Barnett v. Int'l
Harvester Co., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 786 (W.D. Tenn. 1976); Associated Gen'l
Contractors v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974);
Southern Illinois Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972). Contra, Weber v.
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1615 (E.D. La. 1976);
Brunet v. City of Berkeley, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 937 (N.D. Cal. 1975). Cf.
McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 & n.8 (1976), where the Court said:
"Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against the white petitioners in this case upon the
same standards as would be applicable were they Negroes .... [W]e do not consider here
the possibility of [an affirmative action] program, whether judicially required or otherwise
prompted." For a comprehensive history of the evolution of the Philadelphia Plan, see
Jones, supra note 39. Serious questions have been raised about the efficacy of the Philadelphia Plan and other similar "hometown plans" in the construction industry. See, e.g.,
Donagan, The Philadelphia Plan: A Viable Means of Achieving Equal Opportunity in the
Construction Industry or More Pie in the Sky? 20 KAN. L. REV. 195 (1972); Edwards &
Zaretsky, supra note 21, at 31.
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tradesmen in key trades, since the Executive Order was held not
limited to mere policing against positive acts of discrimination.
Thus, the court expressly noted, "The absence of a judicial finding
of past discrimination is also legally irrelevant." 55
The court of appeals in ContractorsAssociation was not deterred by the provision against preferential treatment to eliminate
racial imbalance, which is found in section 703(j)56 of the Civil
Rights Act. The court said, "Section 703(j) is a limitation only upon
Title VII not upon any other remedies, state or federal." 15 7 To the
argument that "a decision to hire any black employee necessarily
involves a decision not to hire a qualified white employee," the
court replied, "This is pure sophistry. The findings in the September 23, 1969 order disclose that the specific goals may be met,
considering normal employee attrition and anticipated growth in
' 58
the industry, without adverse effects on the existing labor force."
In another part of its opinion, however, the court forthrightly
'5 9
conceded, "Clearly the Philadelphia Plan is color-conscious."
While I accept the logical possibility, but not the practical likelihood, that employers subject to a Philadelphia Plan will make all
actual hiring decisions on a color-blind basis, that does not seem to
me to end the debate. As the court apparently recognized, race
must be taken into account, at least in putting together the pool of
applicants. That, at the minimum, is one definite and admitted form
of preferential treatment. If Title VII forbids all racial preferences
in employment (except as a remedy for a proven discriminatory
violation), I do not see how affirmative action programs involving
numerical targets can legally survive. To argue otherwise would
indeed be "pure sophistry."
Does Title VII forbid the preferential treatment that I have
argued is inevitable under the Executive Order? Undoubtedly
there is support in the legislative history of the original 1964 statute
for the conclusion that it does. This is especially true of statements
made by the proponents of Title-VII. Thus, for example, several
members of the House Judiciary Committee declared, "It must
also be stressed that the Commission must confine its activities to
correcting abuse, not promoting equality with mathematical certainty." 0

11442 F.2d at 175.
5642 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(j) (1970), supra note 18.
11442
F.2d at 172.
5
ld. at 176.
"Id. at 173.
60
H.R. REP. No. 914, Pt. 2, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1963) (Additional Views of Congressmen McCulloch, Lindsay, Cahill, Shriver, MacGregor, Mathias, and Bromwell). There
was no majority report of the Committee, except for the text of H.R. 7152 itself.
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Senator Williams commented that "to hire a Negro solely because he is a Negro is racial discrimination, just as much as a
'white only' employment policy."161 Similarly, the floor managers
of the bill in the Senate insisted that "any deliberate attempt to
maintain a racial balance, whatever such balance may be, would
involve a violation of Title VII because maintaining such a balance
' 62
would require an employer to hire on the basis of race."
Despite these assurances, however, the opponents of Title VII
continued to argue that it would require preferential treatment and
racial quotas. The following remarks of Senator Smathers are
typical: "[E]very employer will have to have someone on his staff
whose job will be to determine what percentage each minority
group constitutes in the total population; and he will have to
employ so many of each minority." ' 63 The debate was not laid to
rest until section 7030) was added to the bill, with its provision that
"[n]othing contained in this title shall . . . require .
preferential
treatment." '6 4 Senator Humphrey explained:
The proponents of this bill have carefully stated on numerous occasions that Title VII does not require an employer to
achieve any sort of racial balance in his work force by giving
preferential treatment to any individual or group. Since doubts
have persisted, subsection (j) is added to state this point expressly .65
One plausible explanation of section 7030) is that it was designed to prevent "statutory overkill, ' 66 and so merely confirmed
the "color-blind" view of section 703(a)-(d) initially espoused by
the provision's advocates. Yet in light of the long-running battle
over the alleged preferential requirements of section 703, and the
care and deliberation that went into the drafting of subsection 0(),67
it is also reasonable to conclude that the amendment was meant as
a definitive statement concerning the effect of Title VII on preferential treatment. If it means what it says, section 7030) does no
more than negate any intention to have "this title [Title VII] . . .
require . . . preferential treatment." ' 68 Other provisions of federal

61110 CONG. REC. 8921 (1964).
612110 CONG. REc. 7213 (1964) (Interpretative Memorandum of Title VII of H.R. 7152

submitted jointly by Senators Clark and Chase).
6311 0 CONG. REC. 8175 (1964). See also id. at 7778-81 (remarks of Sen. Tower).
6442 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970), supra note 18 (emphasis supplied).
65110 CONG. REC. 12723 (1964) (emphasis supplied). See also id. at 9881 (remarks of Sen.
Allott).
66Blumrosen, Quotas, Common Sense, and Law in Labor Relations: Three Dimensions of
Equal
Opportunity, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 675, 692 (1974).
6
'See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 12706-07 (1964).
6842 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970), supra note 18.

HeinOnline -- 10 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 39 1976-1977

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 10:28

law and regulations, such as Presidential Executive Orders, would
not be affected. As previously indicated, that was apparently the
opinion of the Third Circuit in Contractors Association.69 Had
section 7030) been intended to possess a longer reach, it would
have been easy enough to provide that nothing "in this title or any
other federal law or regulation shall be interpreted to require or
permit . . .preferential treatment. ..."
Title VII is one of those protean enactments whose meaning
evolves over time. A flexible approach toward interpretation of it
finds reinforcement in the courts' obvious willingness to pay far
more heed to the statute's underlying objective of ensuring equal
opportunity than to the draftsman's exact thoughts on how that
objective should be attained. For example, as Professor James
Jones of Wisconsin Law School has demonstrated in his thorough
history of Title VII in the courts,7 0 the key concept of "discrimination" has undergone a critical transformation, with the focus shifting from the intent of the actor to the effects of the act. Thus, the
lack of malicious intention will not prevent a statutory violation, if
an employer's hiring practices or job qualifications have a disproportionately adverse impact on minorities or women, and are not
71
justified by business necessity.
It is not uncommon today for the term "discrimination" to
connote invidious distinctions, and not merely disparate treatment.
As one of the most distinguished federal judges has remarked, "to
discriminate ...more often means, both in common and particularly in legal parlance, to distinguish or differentiate without sufficient reason." '7 2 If we are satisfied that Title VII's basic purpose of
equal opportunity can best be realized-perhaps can only be
realized-through preferential treatment, including numerical
standards, that would seem "sufficient reason" to interpret section 703(a)-(d) as outlawing only malign, and not benign, discrimination. In the different but analogous case of a proven statutory
violation, at least one federal court of appeals has explicitly concluded that a preferential remedy embodying a numerical hiring
quota was necessary to eliminate the effects of past discrimina-

6
Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 172 (3d Cir. 1971). Contra,
Blumrosen, supra note 66, at 692 n.47.
7
"Jones, The Development of the Law Under Title VII Since 1965: Implicationsof the New
Law, pp. 3-4 (unpublished paper delivered at Rutgers Symposium on EEOC, Newark, New
Jersey,
November 28, 1975).
7
'See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). But an odd asymmetry now
exists; apparently a discriminatory intent, and not merely an adverse effect, is necessary to
establish
a constitutional violation. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
72
Friendly, J., dissenting in NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172, 181 (2d Cir. 1963).
See also Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 675 (1961).
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tion. 73 Accordingly, neither section 703(a)-(d)'s general prohibition of discrimination nor section 703(j)'s specific ban on preferential treatment should be regarded as standing in the way of the
Executive Order's affirmative action program, even though it may
demand in effect that employment preferences be granted on the
basis of race or sex.
The legislative history of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972 provides powerful support for such an approach.
Senator Sam Ervin offered two pertinent amendments to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. The first, No. 829, would have provided, inter
alia:
No department, agency, or officer of the United States shall
require an employer to practice discrimination in reverse by
employing persons of a particular race, or a particular religion,
or a particular national origin, or a particular sex in either fixed
or variable numbers, proportions, percentages, quotas, goals
or ranges ... 74
Speaking in favor of the amendment, Senator Ervin commented,
As a consequence of this lack of understanding of the plain
and unambiguous words of the English language employed in
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Office of Contract
Compliance on virtually every occasion has required
employers seeking Government contracts to practice discrimination in reverse. The EEOC, on less frequent occasions, has
haled employers before its bar to practice discrimination in
reverse.

75

Despite Senator Ervin's ardent advocacy of his amendment, it was
rejected by a vote of 22 to 44.76
Senator Ervin's second amendment, No. 907, would have expanded the applicability of section 7030). 77 He explained his proposal as follows:
It is designed to make the prohibition upon preferential
treatment created by this subsection of the original act applicable not only to the EEOC, but also to the Office of Contract
Compliance and to every other executive department or
agency engaged, either under the statute or under any Presidential directive, in enforcing the so-called equal employment
78
opportunity statutes.
13NAACP v. Alien, 493 F.2d 614, 620-21(5th Cir. 1974). See also Rios v. Steamfitters
Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 631-32 (2d Cir. 1974); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th
Cir. 1974).
1118 CONG. REC. 1662 (1972).
"Id. at 1663.
7"Id. at 1676.
7See id. at 4917.
7"Id. at 4918.
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Senator Javits, speaking in opposition, declared that the effect of
the amendment would be "to apply a particular provision of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 to the Executive Order in order to make
unlawful any affirmative action plan like the so-called Philadelphia
Plan. ' 79 The measure was defeated 30-60.8o
Whatever lingering uncertainties existed regarding the original
intent of the drafters of the 1964 statute would seem to have been
dispelled by the disposition of Senator Ervin's proposed amendments. Congress was plainly informed that the federal government was practicing "reverse discrimination" through such affirmative action programs as the Philadelphia Plan, and it declined to
intervene.
Employment preferences for minorities and women might be
made more palatable for opponents if they could come to recognize
that at present, being a minority or a woman may well be a valid
"qualification" for many jobs."' There is a demonstrated need
today for minority and female role models, especially in the higher
status occupations. Whites and males, as well as minorities and
women, stand to profit from gleaning the insights of minority and
female professors, lawyers, business people, newspaper writers,
and so on. More fundamentally, the whole of our society should be
enriched by the opening up of a vast new spectrum of job opportunities for large segments of the population that were previously
excluded. In this sense, the black who is preferred as a teacher or a
pipefitter, or the woman who is preferred as an engineer or police
officer, is not being favored as an individual. It merely so happens
that, at this moment in history, such persons are endowed with
qualities that must be distributed throughout a wide range of positions in industry and the professions if we are to solve two of our
most pressing social problems. I realize such an approach is profoundly at odds with our cherished traditions of individual merit
and group neutrality, but I believe it accords with the realities of
the 1970's.

III.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, the legitimacy of affirmative action programs, including the limited use of preferential treatment for minorities and
women, should turn on a judicious appraisal of the gains and losses
for our society, and not on abstract concepts like "colorblindness." Deliberate race- or sex-based preferences are danger79

1d.

80

1d.
"1See Sandalow, supra note 4, at 674; Karst & Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal
Protection, 60 VA. L. REV. 955,961-63 (1974). But cf. 110 CONG. REC. 8921 (1964) (remarks
of Sen. Williams) ("race is not a qualification for employment").
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ous medicine, justified only by the gravest circumstances, and they
must not be allowed to become habit-forming. There is the obvious
risk of estranging white ethnic males,8 2 and of driving them into the
camp of political adventurers who in normal times are taken seriously by almost no one. There is the further risk of perpetuating
race or sex stereotypes that must be purged even from our subconscious. After an entire decade of devoted effort by many persons in
the movement for employment equality, however, the results seem
83
almost paltry. I must sadly conclude that for some while longer
heroic measures like affirmative action and preferential treatment,
despite their very real risks, remain our one best hope.

8

2
See, e.g., Baroni, EEOC Implications for the Working Class in a Pluralistic Society
(unpublished paper delivered at Rutgers Symposium on EEOC, Newark, New Jersey, Nov.
28,8 31975); N. GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION 168-95 (1975).
Professor Alfred Blumrosen has provided one of the most imaginative and practical
formulas for calculating how long preferential treatment will have to be continued. He first
points to studies indicating that approximately half of the income and occupational differences between blacks and whites is attributable to discrimination, with the other half
attributable to such variables as education and qualifications. He then suggests:
[W]hen the minority employment rate is no longer double the white rate, but runs at
one and one-half to one, when the median income levels of minorities is 80 to 85
percent rather than 60 to 70 percent that of whites, and when the occupational
distribution is half as skewed as it is now, we will have squeezed out of the society
the worst effects of discrimination. . . . The use of quotas will then become
inappropriate.
Blumrosen, supra note 66, at 695.
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